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BOOK REVIEW
Leveling the Playing Field: How the Law Can Make
Sports Better for Fans. By Paul C. Weiler. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 345.
Hardcover. $29.95.
Reviewed by Jeffrey H. Kahn*
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few months have been eventful ones for
followers of virtually any sport. Baseball player Alex
Rodriguez signed a ten-year deal with the Texas Rangers for
252 million dollars, which is two million dollars more than
the owner paid for the entire team three years earlier. The
Baltimore Ravens, a football team that moved from Cleveland
to replace a team that moved to Indianapolis, won the Super
Bowl. The most valuable player of that game, Ray Lewis, was
charged with murder a few months before the season began.
These sporting events raised or at least intersected with legal
and moral issues. One author has attempted to address the
legal and moral aspects of the sporting world and how they
affect the quality of competition on the field.'
In his book, Leveling the Playing Field: How the Law
Can Make Sports Better for Fans, Paul C. Weiler, the Henry
J. Friendly Professor of Law at Harvard University, has
addressed a diverse range of subjects including drugs,
gambling, player salaries, and competitive sports leagues.
While Weiler's knowledge of the subject matter is extensive
and his proposals are provocative, his proposed solutions and
* J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; B.A., Duke University. The
author is an Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law.
The author would like to thank Jessica Kahn and Andrea Bryant for their
helpful comments and suggestions on this piece.
1. See PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN
MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANs (2000).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
commentary are not always on the mark.
The book is divided into three major sections. Part I
discusses "The Integrity of Sports" and focuses on the
behavior of the players (and how leagues and owners should
react to their behavior). The major topics of this part include
drug use, gambling, and athletes as role models. Part II is an
in-depth discussion of the disputes between players and
owners-particularly the battle by the players to obtain free
agency. Part III discusses league-wide institutional issues
arising over such matters as movement of franchises and
taxpayer-funded stadiums. In each part, Weiler sets forth his
suggestions as to how to improve the sport, in particular
focusing on how such changes could improve the product for
the fans, who are the ultimate consumers and the one group
that has little ability to have its view considered by the three
other major groups-the players, the owners, and the league.'
II. "THE INTEGRITY OF SPORTS"
Weiler begins the book by briefly discussing two very
different issues, the resolution of which, in Weiler's opinion,
requires longer and more careful deliberation than has been
previously expended. First, the author discusses player
misconduct "on the field." That is, how should a league react
when one of its players engages in misconduct that takes
place during a team practice or a game? Examples cited by
the author include basketball player Latrell Sprewell choking
his coach, P.J. Carlesimo, during a practice session,3 baseball
player Roberto Alomar spitting in the face of umpire John
Hirschbeck,4 and boxer Mike Tyson biting the ear of his
2. While it is clear that there are times where the "league" represents the
interest of the owners, e.g., when it comes to developing a salary cap, there are
also times where the interest of the league must be considered separate from
the owners.
3. After the incident, Warriors team owner, Chris Cohen, terminated
Sprewell's entire contract. Commissioner David Stern then suspended Sprewell
for a full 82 games. Arbitrator John Feerick ruled that the Warriors did not
have just cause to terminate Sprewell's contract and lowered the NBA
suspension to 68 games.
4. Alomar's transgression took place on the final weekend of baseball's
regular season, and Alomar was suspended five games by the American League
President, Gene Budig. On account of an appeal by the Major League Baseball
Players Association, Alomar was allowed to play in the baseball playoffs and did




opponent Evander Holyfield.5 Second, the author discusses
the application of civil rights issues to sports. As to that
issue, he focuses on the legal battle of golfer Casey Martin to
use a cart in PGA tour events.6
For player misconduct on the field, Weiler makes the
obvious point that the severity of punishments should differ
depending upon the seriousness of the player's actions. The
worst punishment should be for players that engage in
misconduct in public view and against someone not on their
own team (e.g., a fan, an official, or an opposing player).7
Punishment is required and justified in order to uphold the
moral aspects of the game. Weiler maintains, however, that
actions, like those by Sprewell, which take place out of the
public view, should not be subject to as strict a sanction or to
the discretion of the same institutions. Instead of a league
sanction in such cases, the punishment should be determined
exclusively by the player's team. Weiler contends that a
"private" transgression should not be the basis for the league
to suspend the player from playing on all teams and so should
invoke a lesser sanction.8
To the contrary, as Weiler himself notes later when
discussing the use of recreational drugs by players, the league
has an interest in maintaining the morality of the game in
that many fans do not want to watch players whom they
perceive to be criminals or morally-challenged. A team may
be willing to put up with unwholesome behavior if the player
will help them to a championship, but the reputation of the
league itself will suffer. Thus, contrary to Weiler's view, the
suspension of Sprewell by the league seems justified in order
to protect the sport's status and reputation.
With regard to Martin's ordeal, the author believes that
5. The Nevada Boxing Commission imposed a one-year ban on Tyson.
6. Martin was born with Klippel-Trenauney-Weber syndrome, a rare
disorder that causes Martin severe pain in his legs. The condition makes it both
dangerous and difficult for him to walk. In 1997, Martin challenged the PGA's
no cart rule under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
7. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 15. However, the league must attempt to
respond to each incident with the appropriate amount of suspension. For
example, Orlando Brown of the Cleveland Browns attacked a referee when the
referee's flag hit the player's eye. While the league cannot have players
attacking referees, it is clear that this incident is less heinous than a player
attacking a referee because he disliked the call and such facts should have
mitigated the suspension required.
8. See id. at 16.
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Martin should be allowed to use a cart in order to participate
on the PGA tour.9 Weiler agrees that a league should not be
required to change the fundamental nature of a sport in order
to accommodate a disability, but he argues that walking is
not a fundamental part of golf. ° Further, he believes that the
use of the cart by a healthy golfer would actually be a
disadvantage to that player. He argues that walking between
shots sharpens golfers both physically and mentally." It
would appear that even if Weiler believed that the use of the
cart was advantageous to a healthy golfer (and he admits that
it might be so when competition occurs on an extremely hot
day and a hilly course) he would consider the advantage to be
too minor to offset the desirability of accommodating Martin's
disability.
Weiler concludes that in order to "preserve the moral
appeal of the game," a league must weigh carefully all the
relevant factors concerning each decision it makes, whether it
concerns suspensions (in the case of Sprewell, Alomar, and
Tyson) or outright exclusions (in the case of Martin)." The
author believes that too often leagues react to the emotion of
the moment and a desire to act instantly rather than taking
time to consider the issues dispassionately after the heat of
the initial emotive response has passed.
Next on Weiler's list is the issue of sports gambling.
Although most of his discussion focuses on gambling by
players, the author also discusses gambling by society in
general. His proposed regulatory solution would affect all
gamblers-athletes and non-athletes. Virtually all leagues
consider gambling to be "the ultimate sin," and offending
players have been dealt with harshly. Weiler discusses two of
the more famous examples concerning gambling and athletes.
First, he lays out the facts regarding baseball player Pete
Rose in some detail." Second, Weiler discusses the infamous
9. See id. at 30.
10. See id. at 28-29.
11. See id. at 29.
12. See id.
13. Pete Rose, baseball's career leader for base hits, was investigated by the
league on allegations that he was not only betting on baseball games but also
betting on his own team. As he was also being pursued by the Internal Revenue
Service for failure to report income (from signing baseball cards), Rose agreed to
accept a ruling from the baseball Commissioner that he was "permanently
ineligible" to work in baseball. Although, at the time of the agreement, it
appeared that Rose would have the right to reinstatement, Rose is still banned
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Black Sox scandal. 4 While the consequences in each case
were the same, all the participants were banned for life from
baseball, Weiler believes the two cases should have produced
different outcomes.
The greatest sin is when a player fixes the game, whether
for gambling or any other reason, i.e., the Black Sox scandal
participants deserved the ultimate punishment. The reason
being that when fixing occurs, the integrity of the sport as a
whole is damaged. Fans are attracted to a sport and spend
money in order to see an "honest effort by both sides to do
their best to win a match whose outcome is supposed to be
unknown beforehand." 5 Weiler believes that fixing games is
much less likely to occur today in most professional sports
since the compensation levels are so high. In the Black Sox
scandal, the players' belief that they were underpaid made
them receptive to bribes that the gamblers offered. Given the
amount of money that professional athletes make today, there
will be fewer occasions when financial pressures or
dissatisfaction will induce a player to accept a bribe to fix a
game." Hence, the greatest concern for fixing games is at the
college level where the athletes make no money. Most recent
gambling and point-shaving scandals have involved college
level sports. 7 One important factor does cut against Weiler's
contention that professional sports are somewhat insulated
from the temptation of shaving points. The amount of money
involved in gambling has become so huge that very large
bribes can be offered to tempt even well-paid athletes.
Weiler does not believe that the Pete Rose gambling case
deserves the same punishment, if any at all. Weiler compares
betting on one's own team to win to the performance clauses
in a player's contract. 8 Weiler notes the argument that the
from working in baseball and thus is also not eligible for the Baseball Hall of
Fame.
14. Several players of the Chicago White Sox, who believed they were
underpaid, accepted $100,000 from gamblers to throw the World Series. While
the players were acquitted by a jury, baseball's first Commissioner banned all of
them from the sport. While there is no assertion that the players were
gambling themselves, the issue arose on account of bribes from gamblers.
15. WEILER, supra note 1, at 52.
16. See id. at 51.
17. In 1997, two Arizona State University basketball players pleaded guilty
to point-shaving and in 1996, 13 Boston College football players were suspended
for betting on games (at least two of the players bet against their own team).
18. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 53.
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league may be concerned that players who gamble may
become indebted to bookies and thus more likely to engage in
fixing games in order to pay off the debt. 9 Note that this
possibility is another illustration of the fallacy of Weiler's
assertion that well-paid athletes are largely immune from the
temptation of offers to fix games.
Weiler proposes a solution to this and to the general
societal problem of gambling. He proposes that in order to
gamble, people should be required to first obtain a license.
This license would also serve as a "gambling credit card,"
which would be the only lawfully permissible source of
gambling funds. Once a person's annual amount of credit is
exhausted, the person would have to wait until the following
year to gamble more. 0 While this is a novel and creative
suggestion, it is questionable whether it would solve the
problem since those who truly are addicted to gambling would
merely find ways to engage in illegal gambling, as many do
now.
Another problem with Weiler's proposal is that he once
again overlooks moral considerations and the integrity aspect
of the sport. While gambling by fans on sporting events
enhances the pleasure of watching the games, fans might
become skeptical and lose interest in the sport if they believe
that the players were involved with gamblers. The
association itself suggests the possibility that the player's
efforts might be influenced by gambling considerations, and
that the gamblers have access to inside information about the
status and plans of the teams. Like Caesar's wife, the league
has an interest in ensuring that its players are above
suspicion. Also, it is not beneficial to the integrity of the
game if the players become overly concerned with the point
spread, i.e., it is not conducive to sportsmanship and fan
interest to have the best player on a team insist on remaining
in the game in order to ensure that his bet will be won
because his team wins by thirty points instead of a mere ten.2'
19. See id.
20. See id. at 49. The gambling limit would be set by reference to the
person's income and assets as documented by the Internal Revenue Service, an
interesting expansion to the power of the IRS and the importance of filing a tax
return. Giving greater power to the IRS appears to conflict with the recent
effort to reduce the power of that agency.
21. A benign example of this occurred on February 15, 2001. The Dallas
Mavericks were beating the Cleveland Cavaliers soundly. However, on account
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On a practical level, it is extremely unlikely that Weiler's
system will be implemented since it would attract strong
political opposition.
The next topic addressed by Weiler is the use of drugs by
athletes. Weiler argues that a distinction should be made
between performance-enhancing drugs (such as steroids) and
recreational drugs (such as marijuana and cocaine). His
justification for making that distinction is that performance-
enhancing drugs can alter the nature of the competition and
may not merely harm the user but also harm other athletes
who feel pressure to take such drugs in order to compete with
those who do.22 Thus, leagues must effectively enforce rules
against such drugs, not only for the protection of athletes but
also so fans can be confident that the competition is "fair" in
that everyone is playing by the same rules.23  Weiler
concludes that the best method for ensuring a drug free
environment is systematic testing of all athletes for
performance enhancing drugs. 4 If that ideal solution cannot
be adopted, Weiler contends that the second-best option is to
repeal the ban on such drugs entirely and fully inform the
athletes of the risks involved with such drugs.25
Weiler's second-best option, the complete repeal of the
ban on performance-enhancing drugs, is questionable.
Studies have found that most athletes would use such
substances even if told about the risk involved because they
will overly discount future harm to themselves when
comparing it to the current benefits flowing from enhanced
performance. Also not mentioned by Weiler is the fact that
many fans enjoy watching athletes because they view them as
naturally talented, i.e., athletes have a gift that many do not
have. If athletes could use performance-enhancing drugs, it
of a promotion, if Dallas scored 100 points, the fans would receive coupons for
99-cent Chalupas. Instead of running the clock out, Dallas scored with 3.3
seconds left in the game (and ended up winning 102-81). This led to a fight
between the two teams. As the Cavalier coach stated, "If it happens in the
course of the game, and you get 100 points, that's great. But when it comes
down to 10 seconds and you call a timeout, draw up a play to get a Chalupa. I
would never do that." Associated Press, Cuban Sorry For Chalupa Fiasco (Feb.
21, 2001) <http://www.kval.com/now/story/0%2C1597%2C273720-237% 2 C00 .
shtml>.
22. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 79.
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would detract from their status as "gifted" players. Because
of concerns for the health and safety of the athletes and for
maintaining the fans' idealized image of them, it appears that
this approach is not even close to a second-best option.
Weiler distinguishes the concerns regarding the use of
performance-enhancing drugs from the issues arising from
the use by athletes of recreational drugs. Recreational drugs
may actually impair the performance of the user and
certainly do not enhance it. The use of such drugs will not
harm other competitors because they will not be subject to a
competitive pressure to use them.26 Such use by players also
does not affect the integrity of the game in that fans will have
no reason for concern that some players may have obtained
an unfair advantage by using illegal substances. Weiler
concludes that leagues should not impose bans on players
who use recreational drugs. Instead, he believes that free
market pressures will be sufficient to deal with that problem.
Teams sign players with the intention that the player will
perform at the highest level possible. If a player uses
recreational drugs, his performance will be affected and the
team should have it in the player's contract that the player
can be released if drugs adversely affect his play.27
The author does note one objection to this approach.
Whether they embrace it or not,28 athletes are role models,
and there is a moral aspect to the sports industry. The
leagues have an interest in ensuring that fans do not become
disgusted by a player's behavior, whether on or off the court,
and that impressionable young fans are not led into
emulating the improper behavior of their heroes. If that
problem is left to the contractual power of each team to
control its players' behavior, a team might be willing to take
an unsavory player who will help that team win a
championship. While one team would receive the benefit of
that player's performance, the reputation and moral status of
the entire league will suffer.29 In these cases, the author
agrees that the central league authority must take necessary
action." As noted above, while Weiler does not make the
26. See id. at 80. The author also suggests legalizing marijuana.
27. See id. at 82.
28. In a Nike commercial, Charles Barkley told the world that he is not a
role model.
29. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 96.
30. Although not mentioned in his discussion of the incident, this same type
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connection, this same reasoning applies to player misconduct
during practices and player gambling.
While Weiler accepts this rationale for a league's
response to some behavior, he notes that many leagues are
hypocritical if this is their true justification. Weiler compares
the treatment of players banned for use of recreational drugs
with the treatment of players who have engaged in domestic
abuse and notes the general leniency toward players who
engage in the latter conduct as compared to the harsher
treatment by the leagues against players caught with
recreational drugs.3 The author believes that society is
sending a terrible message when it treats athletic offenders
leniently. Instead, they should be punished as severely as
non-athletes in order to send the right message to non-
athletic potential abusers."
III. "OWNERS VERSUS PLAYERS"
The next section of the book focuses on the financial
battles between the players and the owners. While this
section becomes bogged down with a detailed discussion on
how antitrust law was used by the players, the author
compares the development of the four major professional
sports leagues (hockey, baseball, football, and basketball),
shows how they differ, and attempts to show how those
differences can be attributed to the outcome of the owner-
player conflicts in each sport.
The author asserts that players' unions made a huge
difference with respect to the gains that players made in the
area of salary, and he begins this section by reviewing the
creation of players' unions in each sport.3 Weiler next focuses
on the issue of free agency, that is, the ability of a player to
move from one team to another and thus, create a competitive
market for the player's services.
After a detailed antitrust review, Weiler moves to the
subject of whether free agency has detrimentally affected the
sports product for fans. The author argues that free agency
of reasoning applies to the Sprewell incident and thus, could be the justification
for having the league suspend Sprewell from playing on any other team.
31. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 94. The author commends the National
Football League for adopting a policy in 1998 that took a true moral approach to
players' criminal misbehaviors whether or not they are drug related.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 133.
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has actually created a better product. 4 For example, he notes
that teams can no longer horde talent, and so the market puts
the best players in playing positions where the fans can see
them.
The author sets forth and refutes several of the
arguments that have been made to contend that free agency
has been detrimental to sports. First, there is the loyalty
argument; player allegiance is important to fans, and fans
have an interest in having players stay with their original
teams. He dismisses this argument because if this were true,
then there should also be restrictions on movement by players
determined by the owners, i.e., trades between teams. 5 Also,
the owners' willingness to move franchises to more profitable
locations suggest that fan loyalty is less important to the
owners than profit margins. A major weakness in Weiler's
refutation is that it merely shows that owners are willing to
sacrifice fan loyalty to obtain their own ends. It does not
show that free agency does not cause additional damage to
fan loyalty. It may be fair to permit the players to sacrifice
fan loyalty for their financial goals since owners do so, but
that does not respond to the contention that all such actions
are detrimental to the game.
Weiler also tackles the issue of whether free agency has
allowed the sport to become too expensive for fans. That is,
free agency has increased the salaries of players in all sports
and thus, the direct cost to the fan to attend a game and the
indirect cost of watching the game on television has
skyrocketed. 6 Weiler contends that it is consumer demand,
not the salaries of the players, that has increased the price of
sports. Instead, the players are merely beneficiaries of that
increased demand.37
Finally, Weiler discusses what perhaps is the most
important issue, competitive balance. Sporting leagues are
unusual in that although all teams compete against each
other, they are also tied to each other in that if one team
becomes too dominant, fans will lose interest in the sport as a
34. See id. at 181.
35. See id. at 177.
36. The cost of obtaining the rights to televise sporting events has increased
dramatically and thus, the cost to advertise on such programs has increased
which leads to an increase in the price of the product being advertised. Thus,
the increased cost is ultimately borne by the consumer.
37. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 172-73.
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whole, i.e., teams are interested in the collective good not just
their own individual team's success. Fans in less prosperous
markets become unhappy when they conclude that the
current system favors wealthy owners of large market teams,
i.e., a wealthy team can and does buy a championship.
Weiler concedes that this is an issue. He notes that the
National Football League, which has a hard salary cap and
revenue sharing, creates small-market champions; whereas
Major League Baseball, a league with no cap and extremely
limited revenue sharing, provides a clear advantage to
wealthier large-market teams. If the same few teams
dominate a sport year after year, fan interest will decline.
Weiler is not in favor of a complete free market system.
He concurs that some restrictions on salaries and player
movement are needed. The author argues that any
restriction on salaries or movement by players should be
aimed exclusively at maintaining a competitive balance in the
league (thus, improving the product for fans). Such
restrictions should not be invoked to improve the financial
situation of the owners.38 The author proposes a novel
solution to achieve that goal. First, Weiler concedes that
based on the collective goods issue, some type of revenue
sharing is appropriate. 9 As to salary restrictions, Weiler
would replace a hard or soft salary cap system with a
"payroll standard." The author dismisses the salary cap
system for two reasons. First, it does not take into account
the different costs of living in each area." A player earning
$100,000 in Houston, Texas (a state with no state income tax
and a lower cost of living) has greater purchasing power than
a player who receives the same salary in New York City.
Second, Weiler contends that such a system hurts the
competitive balance in that teams are penalized when an
expensive player with a long-term contract does not perform
up to the expected standards. The competitive balance of the
league is hindered by forcing teams to wait for such player's
38. See id. at 197.
39. See id. at 191.
40. A hard salary cap is one where teams cannot spend over a flat amount
that is the same for all teams. The National Football League has such a cap in
place. A soft salary cap is one where limits are placed on the salaries of "new"
players. However, a team is under no such limit when resigning its existing
players. The National Basketball Association has such a system in place.
41. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 194.
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contracts to expire before the team can employ higher priced
talent that might improve the quality of the team and thus
contribute to creating a more competitive league.2
Weiler's "payroll standard" proposal establishes agraduated payroll tax on owners based on a departure from a
median figure that is agreed upon by the players and
owners. 43  The median figure could be an agreed upon
percentage of the league's revenues and thus, it would be
flexible enough to deal with the rise and fall of the league's
success. Not only would over-spending teams have to pay a
salary tax, but under-spending teams would also have to pay
a tax for being below the required amount. Weiler contends
that revenue sharing alone is not enough to help the
competitive balance because there is no guarantee that small-
market or low-spending teams would use that revenue to
acquire more talent and thus create a more balanced
competition." A tax on teams that spent either too much or
too little on players would create greater parity because
everyone would be encouraged to spend nearly the same
amount; thus, producing a more balanced playing field.
Players should find this acceptable since they would receive a
guaranteed portion of the league-wide revenues.
This proposal appears to have merit. It better addresses
the concerns both of teams such as the Yankees who try to
buy championships every year and teams such as the
Montreal Expos who, although performing poorly on the field,
actually make a profit because of revenue sharing and a low
salary schedule. However, it is not perfect. First, it isdifficult to see how this system deals with the cost of living
issue that Weiler raises when dismissing the hard cap. At
least with a hard cap, some type of cost of living index could
easily be installed to deal with the problem, but it is not clear
how that remedy could be employed in Weiler's system.
Weiler does not explain what is to be done with the revenues
collected by the graduated tax. Perhaps they would be shared
throughout the league; but if they are given to underpaying
teams, it is unclear how the system would solve the
competitive balance problem. Giving any of the tax to teams
that overpaid or underpaid would mitigate the sanction that
42. See id. at 195.




the tax is designed to serve, and so perhaps none of the tax
would be distributed to those teams.
Weiler fails to comment on one important aspect
regarding the labor battles between the players and the
owners. One weapon used by both sides has been the strike
or lockout. It is clear that league popularity suffers when a
strike or lockout occurs. A probable reason for this is that
such behavior reminds the public that sports is a business,
not a pastime. While it is perhaps irrational, many fans view
professional sports as a game in which the players participate
for the sheer joy of the sport-a game that the fan would love
to play for any amount of money. Any time the brutal
business aspect of sports is thrust upon the fans, some degree
of interest is lost.
IV. "OWNERS VERSUS OWNERS-AND FANS"
The final section of the book covers three major
issues-franchise movements, taxpayer-funded stadiums, and
league expansions. Weiler first discusses the issue of
franchise movements. He begins by covering the legal battle
by Al Davis, the owner of the Oakland Raiders, to move his
team to the Los Angeles area. Initially, the other National
Football League owners voted not to allow Davis to move his
team. Davis sued the National Football League, and a jury
held for Davis awarding the Raiders 11.5 million dollars.
Since this was an antitrust case, that amount was trebled.45
While cities, such as Oakland and Cleveland, bemoan the loss
of their teams, Weiler believes that judicial scrutiny over
franchise movements is misguided. Such oversight would
likely focus too much emphasis on the cost to the losing city
while ignoring the benefits to the new city. Weiler agrees
then that the league should be the ultimate authority on
whether it makes sense for a team to relocate.46 Note that
leagues also have a legitimate interest in limiting the
movement of franchises because such departures remind the
fans that sports are truly a business; and, as noted above
with regard to strikes and lockouts, that causes a loss of fan
interest.
The next issue covered is the ability of a team to obtain a
45. The Ninth Circuit upheld the jury's decision. Later, Davis moved the
team back to the Oakland area.
46. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 262.
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taxpayer-funded stadium by either moving or threatening to
move the franchise. While politicians sometimes argue that
sports teams create revenue for the city, Weiler notes that all
economists agree that sports franchises do not create net
revenue for the community.7 Weiler concludes that Congress
should step in to prevent cities from competing with each
other by using taxpayer funds to obtain or keep teams in their
area. Weiler argues that Congress should pass a law which
prohibits the use of tax funds to build a stadium.48 Weiler is
consistent in that he believes that local governments should
not be permitted to use taxpayer money to obtain or retain
any business entity, sports or otherwise.4
This appears to be paternalistic. Why should Congress
restrict the decisions of local communities as to how they
spend their tax dollars? Weiler argues that such local
intervention confers no net benefit to the nation's economy
because a gain for one community is a loss for another."° That
is an extraordinary view to be taken by someone who
otherwise strongly advocates the benefits of competition. In
any event, if economists are correct that sports teams do not
provide a net revenue gain to a community, then it is a
question of whether a community wishes to expend its
resources for entertainment, and Congress has no legitimate
role to play in deterring a community from making that
choice.
Weiler also discusses the issue of franchise expansion.
Weiler is a proponent of expansion (especially in lieu of
franchise movement) since it gives more fans the ability to
watch a local team." However, Weiler fails to address one
issue with regard to expansion. While it is likely that many
other communities could support a franchise, it is not clear
that there is a sufficient pool of talent to support expansion.
Spreading available talent by distributing it among too many
teams weakens the quality of the game and thereby reduces
fan interest. Fans want only the truly elite to perform in the
league. This same objection applies to Weiler's final solution,
discussed below.
47. See id. at 267.
48. See id. at 275. The one exception to this rule would be a tax imposed on
those who use the stadium - i.e., a tax on stadium parking, concessions, etc.
49. See id. at 277.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 321.
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In the end, Weiler advances his final solution, which
reflects his antitrust background, to create a better sports
product. The best condition for producing an optimum
product is competition from others. Weiler notes that the
leagues in each of the major sports have had de facto
monopoly positions.52 He suggests breaking up each league
into smaller leagues that would compete with each other. He
believes that this would not only provide the solution to
franchise movements (since cities would have increased
bargaining power with more competition) but would also be a
solution to many of the other problems discussed in the
book.5"
This final proposal is at odds with the history of
professional sports. If history is any indicator for the future,
monopolies appear to be inevitable in professional sports.
Several times, other leagues have been formed to compete
and either have failed or have been absorbed by the
established league. The reason for this appears to be that fan
interest focuses on the best; and once a league establishes
itself as that, the other leagues suffer and eventually die,
thereby reestablishing the monopoly status.
52. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 327. As it was not in existence at the time,
it is not clear if Weiler would consider the XFL a legitimate competitor to the
National Football League.
53. See id. at 333.
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